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Showing posts with label Ghana oil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ghana oil. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

IMANI Report : Government fumbling with our oil money already?

We have to commend Government’s recent efforts to loosen up a bit over the now contentious issue of Ghana’s predicted oil revenues. The question is whether it’s opening up enough.

A couple of days ago, the Ministry of Finance’s Resource Tax Advisor, Dr. Amoako Tuffuor, granted an interview to Joy FM’s Kojo Oppong-Nkrumah on the above-mentioned subject, in which he appeared to have outlined, albeit only in brief detail, Government’s approach to projecting estimates of national earnings from present (and future?) oil finds.

Dr. Amoako’s efforts, far from settling the issue, have only raised deeper questions about the seriousness with which government of Ghana is investing official time and commitment towards designing a fiscal framework that responds effectively to the needs and threats of an oil economy.

The following, judging by Dr. Tuffuor’s responses to Kojo Oppong-Nkrumah’s questions, appear to be the elements that together constitute official government thinking on the subject of prudently anticipating revenue outcomes from oil in order to soundly plan how to spend any such proceeds.

1. The calculations are based on the entire anticipated lifetime of the Jubilee field.
2. The calculations are based on estimates of the total “recoverable” petroleum resources in this field.
3. The key determinant of proceeds from above calculations is the “international price of oil”.
4. Wide ranges of earning estimates are acceptable for fiscal planning purposes.

We consider each of these principles less rigorous than should be the case and within certain policy contexts actually dangerous.

But firstly, we need to establish clearly why it is important for our country’s financial managers to make rigorous forecasts of oil revenue prior to and throughout actual production.

1. If our intention is to put some of the oil proceeds in interest bearing instruments or other commercial investment vehicles we can only be successful if in our search for opportunities and negotiations with counterparties we have a good idea of what levels of investment on our side are at stake.
2. Many truly effective social investment programs, for instance building technology transfer mechanisms between research institutes and industry, have a lifecycle longer than the annual budget round. If oil revenue is likely to be a key source for such investments, then it would be important to know in advance, to a reasonable degree of accuracy, how much money would be available over the multi-year cycle of such programs. We must at least be able to predict with some accuracy what the MINIMUM inflow shall be in order to budget appropriately for the scale and scope of such programs.
3. In the same vein, government borrowing and lending may be predicated on future flows of oil revenue. For instance, government may decide to rack up debts for two years running in anticipation that budget surpluses may be possible in year 3 and 4, thus neutralising the real impact of such debts. Such fiscal techniques can only be prudent when government is properly advised about, at least, the minimum expected inflows from the oil sector.

There are of course several reasons why rigorous and evidence-based forecasting is critical, but the above-listed should suffice for the moment in underlying the absolute importance of not taking this exercise lightly.

We will now return to Dr. Tuffuor’s implied principles and state our objections thereto.

24-Year Lifetime

1. If our hearing was sound, then Dr. Tuffuor and his team believe that Jubilee shall be active for 24 years, produce 500 million barrels over the period, and that the average price of oil shall be $100 per barrel. Once again, as we have had occasion to complain time without number, no detailed analysis of these assumptions have subsequently followed these statements. It is not clear whether some projections have been made regarding the prospectivity (likely output) of other finds beside Jubilee that shall come on stream over the period and how such finds shall impact these figures.

2. The main point of course is that the combined wisdom of all the Winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics shall fall short in any attempt to rigorously project proceeds from a resource like oil over 24 years.

The “black swan” (catastrophic) events that are possible over such a long stretch of modern time are simple uncountable. War in the Middle East. Calamity in the Persian Gulf. Extension of Delta Militancy over the Gulf of Guinea. Invention of a portable thermonuclear automobile engine. Global depression. A destabilisation of the Ghanaian continental shelf. 24 years simply give rise to too many scenarios.

3. For the reason above, it is highly doubtful that a use of historical data shall be sufficient to allow one to accurately predict the average price of petroleum over a 24-year period through any defensible technique of interpolation or extrapolation.

And at any rate the minimal and maximal figures, based upon which that average price is determined, are likely to vary so widely as to make the average annual income so derived meaningless. This is simply to say that there will be many years in which the actual annual incomes deviates so wildly from the estimated mean (average) income that the model ceases to be helpful to fiscal managers. This method clearly violates a widely accepted norm in statistics.

4. Perhaps most importantly Ghana has in the past few years developed a key innovation for fiscal management in the form of the “medium-term expenditure framework” (MTEF). The MTEF methodology is to employ 4 (in rare cases, 5) years as a planning guide for financial budgeting purposes.

If, as most of us agree, oil proceeds shall constitute a significant source of national revenue in the coming years and ought therefore to be accommodated, then what we should be aiming to do is to integrate such revenue forecasts into the MTEF. That means we ought to be breaking down our projections into blocks of 5 years, each with its own explicit assumptions. It seems to us far more prudent to attempt to define assumptions and expected prevailing conditions 5 years ahead into the future and thus to make price and volume forecasts about our valuable oil resource over such a limited range of variability than to try to do the same over a period of 24 years.

5. Luckily for all concerned, the development of the Jubilee field itself has been demarcated into phases. The first phase is expected to last between 4 to 5 years (2010 to 2015 or 2011 to 2015). It seems to us more prudent therefore to restrict initial forecasting to this phase and to develop models for other phases in the clear knowledge that such models are bound to be revised closer to their time of use.

After all, besides the black swan events mentioned above and their potential effect on oil price volatility, there are other more certain developments that shall strongly impact on how much money Ghana makes from oil. Taxation and investment regime policy, the evolution of deepwater technology, changes to the profile of Ghana’s petroleum geology, changes in the value chain linking upstream and downstream, and structural changes to the oil industry itself (in the equipment market for instance) are all prime candidates.
Recoverable Resources

1. The use of the “500 million recoverable barrels of oil” estimate over the 24-year period compounds the problems associated with the 24-year model described above. Apart from the complicated issue of predicting which other finds may come on-stream, there is of course the fact that “reserves forecasting” is in itself a very complex, contentious, process all over the world. The methodologies for estimating “proven reserves” are constantly in turmoil. In our specific case, we simply do not know enough of the geology of our offshore petroleum-bearing rocks to bother making such definite estimates.

2. Luckily for us, when we restrict ourselves to the “phase of development” approach. Most of these problems disappear. That is because rather than using the “total recoverable resources” - two kilometers under the sea - method as our guiding light we shall be using the “installed capacity” approach. The latter approach is based simply on what investments have been planned, costed, and financed, to produce what amount of oil.
This is a far more rigorous approach because such investments embody market risk analysis, which is always superior to bureaucratic calculation. Simply put, Kosmos, GNPC, Anadarko and Tullow are no fools. If they are putting in, say, $4 billion to produce 120,000 barrels of oil per day (at peak level) for the next 5 years we can reasonably estimate that some figure close to this volume shall be produced over the period. They are borrowing hard cash to do this; they are thus incentivised to be more rigorous in their forecasting.

3. Also, as discussed in the previous section, the prevailing conditions, including the legal and policy regime, are likely to be more stable over the 1st phase of development. We can thus safely assume that using the likely production volume over 5 years beginning with first oil is a more prudent approach. As also is using an average price that accords more closely with the historical data encompassing those 5 years.

Thus it is perfectly reasonable to use the $60 figure previously mentioned by the Ministry of Energy and a computed volume of 144 million barrels of oil (80,000 barrels per day average instead of 120,000 barrels in order to accommodate various fluctuations, due to weather, geological variability, industrial action etc.) for phase 1 of Jubilee, and to assume that no other find (Teak, Odum, Dzata etc.) would have been sufficiently developed to begin production. Given current challenges in raising financing for the Jubilee gas projects and uncertainties about the value chain of Ghana’s offshore gas in the medium-term, it is also prudent to ignore the impact of wet (as well as “stranded”) gas in these calculations.

4. The average annual revenue over the five years thus amounts to $1.72 billion in the model adopted above. As argued in the preceding paragraphs, the deviations from this mean figure for actual annual inflows are likely to be much, much, more suppressed because of all the precautions we have taken.

5. Note however that this is gross economic output. We need to find the net national income. Doing so will require addressing the other two principles enunciated by Dr. Amoako Tuffuor.

Oil Price as Key Determinant
1. While there is indeed no doubt that the price of oil is an important determinant of net national income, it is by no means the only critical one. Equally as important is the unit cost of production (i.e. how much it costs to bring one barrel of oil from the seabed into the FPSO – Floating, Production, Storage & Offloading vessel). Dr. Tuffuor’s complete silence on this matter during the interview and subsequently was worrying.

2. When one looks at the historical price data for the past two decades, one is actually pleasantly surprised that over stretches of 5 years or less the graph appears quite smooth actually. Major price spikes last a few weeks after which levels then revert to the historical trend. In that sense, we can be reasonably assured that computing an average price for oil over 5 years is far from reckless, and provided the right calculations are performed on the historical data the emergent figure is likely to prove useful. $60 is thus a sound estimate in acknowledgment of the factors identified in the preceding.

3. In similar vein, while it is true that cost of production figures also vary, historical trends are useful in gauging their likely levels over time. The secondary information we have from the program of development of the Jubilee field approved by the Ministry of Energy, on GNPC’s advice, makes no sense.

4. As a matter of urgency, the relevant authorities should publish the full assumptions underlying their production cost model. Until they do, observers like us are entitled to use for our purpose West African typical rates for FPSO costs, labour costs, insurance/short-term finance costs, transport costs, and safety/environmental costs. A triangulation of Nigerian, Ivorian, and Equatorial Guinean cost trends (bolstered with data from the United States Energy Information Administration) should suffice. We would maintain in those circumstances that $34 per barrel is a reasonable estimate of unit production cost. We have seen figures from industry insiders for the relevant geographies that go as high as $50.

5. Then also, there is a need for the accounting template being used for all the income analysis to be published. The accounting template determines what investment types count as an exploration, development or production cost, all of which receive different kinds of treatment when determining what the net proceeds to Ghana shall be.

For instance, the latest indication is that not only shall the builders of the FPSO operate the platform, they shall also be leasing it to the Jubilee consortium. In accounting terms, does this imply a transfer of costs from development to production category, or what? Is Government carried interest to be treated as a dividend, and therefore levied on profit, or a direct share of output, and therefore levied on gross production prior to EBITDA, and if the latter what are the tax deductibility implications, precisely?

6. In the absence, as we have long complained, of any serious information from the relevant authorities, save for media soundbites, we shall proceed to use reasonable, elementary, accounting and analysis, and shall be fully justified for doing so.

7. There is no doubt that government’s 5% royalty is applied directly to gross output. Thus government will be entitled to a little over $86 million from the $1.72 billion mentioned above before the serious math even begins. That leaves $1.64 billion.

There is now a question as to how carried interest is to be treated. Let us assume that we can apply this also directly. That gives us another $164 million to be apportioned to government share. We have $1.47 billion remaining. We are on safe ground if we assert that government from this point on can only receive income derived as a percentage of profit, which means we must going forward accommodate development and production costs.

If we use $34 as the production cost per barrel, then we are confronted with a whopping $980 million of cost per annum. Taxable income then declines to $490 million. Now, we must account for development costs which, under basic accounting rules, should be amortised over 5 years. As total development costs have been pegged at $3.15 billion, the annual sum slated for capital depreciation equals $650 million.

8. It should be obvious to even the most casual reader that in the scenario we have portrayed above the Netherlands-registered Jubilee Field Consortium shall declare a loss of $160 million for year 1 at least, and depending how they work out “retained losses”, not only shall they not pay any taxes for that year but they may actually pile up these losses over the first five years to the tune of $800 million. Ghana shall thus receive its statutory $250 million per year over this period, but shall see this sum barely rise in phase two of development, when production is expected to ramp up to 250,000 barrels per day, due to accumulated losses.

9. What we have sought to demonstrate above is that “cost of production”, as well as the threat of tax evasion due to “internal mispricing” (wherein business costs are exaggerated) are as important a determinant of government earnings as the price of oil.

Now it may well be that in the absence of an official accounting template we have committed the basic error of double counting, wherein some costs already accounted for under one category are assigned to the other, but it is for this reason that government should publish its production costs assumptions and the accounting template it has adopted. Bear in mind, dear reader, that in the scenario described above government of Ghana shall be responsible for 3.75% of the losses declared above, a not insignificant $6 million per annum, and as Government increases its participating interest as it is seeking to do the greater its share of any such losses shall be.

Range of Estimates

1. Without putting too fine a point on the matter, there is hardly any doubt that the position taken by the Dr. Tuffuor-led team that we accept the validity of wide ranges of estimates ($244 million as demonstrated above up to $1 billion based on the MOFEP model) is a dangerous one. It amounts to saying that we should not bother to plan at all, since the statistical variation of the figures being produced makes nonsense of any notion of serious financial forecasting.

2. Or, we could endeavour to use the lowest figure in any “rigorously produced” range of estimates for planning purposes as this would clearly be the prudent thing to do. An overflow account can easily accommodate any extra revenue, but certainly not shortfalls. Thus government should state its position on how it treats ranges of estimates. It cannot tell us that its fiscal models treat all figures on the sensitivity analysis graph equally, which brings us to the point on rigour.

3. The role of variables in forecasting is to develop probabilities. The role of the government’s fiscal manager is to turn those probabilities into a model. In a system such as the one we are discussing we are concerned about “prudency”. The simple argument is that it is fine to underestimate but dangerous to overestimate. Thus forecasting for anything other than academic purposes, and in particular forecasting for fiscal purposes, should be based on the rigorously produced “minimum figure”. Furthermore, variables cannot be admitted on the whim of government analysts. Variables ought to be based on rigourous and explicit assumptions, hence our constant requests to the relevant authorities to PUBLISH THE ASSUMPTIONS

CONCLUSION

As far as transparency and accountability in the oil sector is concerned, Government of Ghana has begun on a not too good note. There has been a tendency to opt for bureaucratic substitutes to truly open discussion of the issues. So called “public forums” mean little unless government managers are prepared to engage in a full and open conversation about ALL ASPECTS of oil resource and revenue management.

We see a subtler but more dangerous trend with respect to the above concern. By going through the motions of subscribing to such mechanisms as the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) for the oil and gas sector, government would be able to argue that it is abiding by the tenets of good natural resource governance, when the truth is that it is complicating the very process of accountability through bureaucratic posturing.

We note that the Ghana EITI process (or GHEITI) has been in place, on candidacy basis, for the general mining regime since 2007. We are still at least 3 months away from an aggregated, *independently vetted*, publication of revenue payments and other crucial data related to the non-petroleum mining industry in Ghana, as part of the country’s validation report. We note that the EITI process as currently constituted boast of civil society participation, and we have nothing but respect for the individual members of the National Steering Committee of the EITI, we are however not sure on what basis the process is considered representative of the diversity of civil society focuses and interests in this matter.

We note further that the GHEITI validation exercise undertaken by Mr. Martin Amidu and others is not in the public domain. Indeed, even the draft processes supposedly guiding Ghana’s extension of EITI to the oil and gas sector have not been adequately publicised. This falls short of the transparency the entire process has been designed to foster.

In short, we are not convinced that government of Ghana shall be able to fulfill its obligations with respect to accountability and transparency by simply complying with the mechanics of the GHEITI, especially as presently designed.

As far as we are concerned, and we know we speak for a great many individual Ghanaians and civil society organisations, transparency and accountability can only come about through a full and unrestrained discussion with the GENERAL PUBLIC about ALL ASPECTS of the oil sector management process.

Until that happens, the course for Ghana shall be into the oil cesspool of shattered hopes and disillusion.


Courtesy of IMANI Center for Policy Education & AfricanLiberty.org.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Ghana needs effective laws to protect oil

Koforidua, March 3, GNA - Mr. Samuel Ofosu Ampofo, Eastern Regional Minister, has advocated the formulation of good policies and enactment of effective laws to protect the country's oil find.

He also called for the training of Ghanaians in technical skills to enable them to take up jobs in the oil and gas industry.

Mr. Ofusu Ampofo was speaking at a consultative forum on management of expected petroleum wealth of the country, organized for residents of Koforidua and its environs, on Tuesday.

Participants suggested that such wealth should be invested in projects that would bring high returns to the nation.

They were of the view that oil revenue should be used for the building of better facilities for environmental protection and the development of agriculture and iron and steel industry and other sectors of the economy.

Mr. Yaw Boateng, Headmaster of New Juaben Senior High School, noted that if the expectation of people living in oil-discovered areas was not realized that could create problems.

He said oil exploitation required high technology, which the people in oil communities might not necessarily possess.

Mr. Boateng reminded Ghanaians that revenue obtained from cocoa, timber, gold and other resources was used for the development of the entire country without the creation of a special fund for the benefit of people in communities where those products were acquired.

Mr. Richard Kingston of the Ghana Institute of Surveyors, advised Ghanaians to disabuse their minds that the oil find was a panacea to Ghana's economic problems.

He explained that oil revenue could be used for the building of roads, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure but people would have to work hard to enable them to pay taxes for the maintenance of those facilities.

Mrs. Cedonia Dere of the Community Based Rural Development Project of the Eastern Regional Coordinating Council, appealed to government to invest a substantial amount of oil revenue in youth development and viable economic ventures to create more jobs for the people.

GNA

Source: GNA - Ghana News Agency

Invest the oil revenue - Eastern Regional participants

Koforidua, March 3, GNA - Participants at a consultative forum in Koforidua on how to manage the expected petroleum wealth of the country, had suggested that the wealth be invested in projects that would bring high returns to the nation as a whole.

They urged that the oil wealth be used to develop better structures for environmental protection and the development of other sectors of the economy like farming and the iron and steel industry.

Mr Yaw Boateng, Headmaster of the New Juaben Senior High School, said the oil industry required some technical skills and if only people around the Western Region were employed, there was the possibility of not getting those with the required qualifications for employment.

Mr Boateng said before the discovery of the oil, some other communities were producing cocoa, timber and gold, but the money realized was used to develop the whole country and no special funds were set up for the areas where the wealth were created.

Mr Richard Kingston of the Ghana Institute of Surveyors suggested the playing down of the idea that the oil revenue should be shared or that the wealth from that sector would solve all the challenges facing the country.

He explained that the development of the oil would require the construction of better infrastructure like roads, hospitals and others, and that would also require that the citizens pay high maintenance fees to continue to enjoy those facilities at least for some time.

Mrs Cedonia Dere of the Community Based Rural Development Project of the Eastern Regional Coordinating Council (ERCC), called for a substantial part of the petroleum wealth to be used to promote youth development and employment, to help stop the rural/urban migration.

The Eastern Regional Minister, Mr Samuel Ofosu-Ampofo, called for more efforts at training the human resource base for the oil and gas industry, so that Ghanaians could take commanding heights in the industry.

He called for more effective laws to protect some aspects of the industry for Ghanaians.

GNA

Source: GNA - Ghana News Agency

Thursday, February 18, 2010

Oil Offers Hope of Middle-Income Status for Ghana


BUT WILL THE CORRUPT NDC AND NPP POLITICIANS ALLOW GHANA TO BENEFIT?

Oil Price

  • Gold, cocoa exports helped economy weather global crisis
  • Oil coming on stream in 2011, could bring middle-income status in 10 years
  • $600 million IMF loan has boosted reserves, strengthened currency

In the next few years, Ghana will become an oil producer.

If the country uses its new-found oil wealth wisely, it stands the chance of achieving middle-income status within ten years, according to the IMF’s latest analysis.

Ghana is one of Africa’s frontier emerging markets, having entered the global capital market for the first time in September 2007. Its past wealth lay in gold and cocoa―commodities that have remained in high demand, and which have helped the country weather the recent global recession.

Despite Ghana’s favorable long-term prospects, it faced an external financing crisis in 2008-09. Highly expansionary budget policies ahead of the 2008 elections boosted inflation and eroded its international reserve position. A slump in foreign exchange inflows linked to the global financial crisis made things worse. At the government’s request, the IMF put together a three-year lending arrangement of $600 million in mid-2009 to strengthen Ghana’s international reserves. Linked to tighter budget policies, this worked well. Ghana’s currency recovered its strength, and inflation began to fall.

In this interview, the IMF’s mission chief for Ghana, Peter Allum, talks about the prospects for Ghana.

IMF Survey online: What has been the impact of the global economic crisis on Ghana?

Allum: Ghana has been affected, but less so than many other frontier emerging markets. Private remittances from those working abroad has fallen by about a fifth, and foreign direct investment has fallen to a four-year low. At the same time, global economic uncertainty has led to a slump in the domestic construction industry.

But unlike a lot of African commodity exporters, Ghana has been very fortunate that its two main exports, gold and coca, fared very well during the global recession. Global demand and prices for both have remained very strong and that has helped it weather the recession better than most countries.

At the same time, Ghana doesn’t have a very large manufacturing base, unlike South Africa, so it hasn’t been affected by the slump in manufacturing trade globally. And its financial sector is also relatively insulated from the global financial system.

So while growth has slowed, it’s still in the 4 percent range, down from 7 to 8 percent in 2008. For Africa as a whole, we’re projecting growth of 1 percent in 2009, so it’s substantially higher than Ghana’s peers in Africa.

IMF Survey online: Ghana was recently granted an IMF loan of $600 million. How is it using those resources?

Allum: We agreed on a new loan of $600 million in the middle of 2009 that will be dispersed over a three-year period. The loan has helped strengthen the international reserve position of the central bank. That in turn has brought greater confidence in Ghana’s balance of payments and has helped avoid the currency depreciation and associated inflation that we saw in 2008 and the first half of 2009.

At the same time, the fact that the IMF is willing to stand behind Ghana’s economic program has made it easier for the World Bank to move quickly in 2009 to make its own loan of $300 million. The IMF-supported program has also encouraged bilateral donors to continue with their funding.

IMF Survey online: What are the main challenges facing Ghana?

Allum: Ghana’s problems are mostly homegrown. The government had a very expansionary fiscal policy in 2008 ahead of the national elections, with the fiscal deficit expanding to 15 percent of GDP or more.

With stronger expenditure management in 2009, the deficit was substantially reduced. But that remains far too high. At current levels, the public debt is still rising rapidly, and heavy budget borrowing from the banking system is keeping interest rates high and taking money away from potential corporate investment.

"Ghana has been very fortunate that its two main exports, gold and coca, fared very well during the global recession."

Bringing down inflation represents another challenge. Inflation has historically has been higher in Ghana than in other African countries The government got it down to about 10 percent at the end of 2007, but then as a result of the global food and fuel price increases, it rose through 2008 and in 2009 to about the 21-22 percent range. But it’s started to come down again now.

IMF Survey online: You mentioned cocoa and gold. Will those two sectors be the main source of growth and jobs in the years to come?

Allum: It will help the economy, but the areas which have been growing fastest in the recent past have been the financial services sector and communications. And those two sectors have been core areas of growth throughout Africa, and it’s quite likely that that will continue in Ghana also.

Ghana also has prospects to expand its commercial farming sector, but that partly depends on improving its transport link from the interior to the coast.

But the big story for Ghana is that oil production will start in 2011, and that will lead to quite a substantial increase in output. Now that won’t create many jobs in and of itself. It’s a very capital-intensive industry and the oil is based offshore so a lot of those jobs are going to be expatriate jobs. But it will generate a substantial boost in revenues for the government—we estimate in the range of 6 to 7 percent of GDP. If that money is used wisely, it could lead to a substantial improvement in Ghana’s infrastructure and its competitiveness, and that could lead to further growth and job creation.

IMF Survey online: We know from experience that oil resources aren’t always used wisely. How do you think Ghana will manage?

Allum: The perceived wisdom is that resources can be a curse for economies. When you look at oil exporters, they have not always seen the benefits in terms of stronger growth and improved living standards. But when you look closely at resource exporters, there are some that have done very well. For example, Botswana has moved into middle-income country status on the back of diamond exports even though it’s a landlocked country.

"The big story for Ghana is that oil production will start in 2011, and that will lead to quite a substantial increase in output."

The difference seems to be in the quality of the economic and political institutions. To use resources well, you need a system that can look to the long term and invest wisely, rather than using the resources to satisfy interest groups. Ghana has a well-developed democracy. We hope that it will enable the country to identify a consensus on its developmental needs. And its budgeting system, although it needs substantial improvement, is better than in many countries in Africa.

We will be working with the government within the framework of the IMF-supported program to reduce the fiscal deficit substantially in 2010 and 2011. That will be important to ensure that the oil revenues, when they come on stream, can be used to finance new projects and programs rather than just being used to finance the fiscal deficit.

IMF Survey online: You have served as mission chief for Ghana since 2008. What is your take on the country’s future?

Allum: Ghana has always stood out as one of the more promising countries in Africa, and that has been reflected in the attention that they’ve got. President Obama’s visit in June 2009 signaled international recognition of their success on the democratic front, having achieved a peaceful democratic transition now on two occasions, in 2000 and in 2008. That can only help bring attention and business interest to Ghana.

But it’s also a country which is still struggling with a very high level of poverty. You see that on the streets. There’s a lot of people in very marginal jobs, selling products from the side of the road to cars and a lot of small businesses.

Yet when you look at the aggregate statistics, Ghana is one of the countries in Africa which has managed to achieve quite strong rates of growth. The business sector is doing relatively well. And although there are overall capacity constraints and quality issues and staffing within the government, there are a large number of very bright people working in the ministries. That offers quite a bit of hope for Ghana’s future.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Ghana oil – seeking national or some personal selfish interests?

Oil exploration and exploitation in Ghana is believed to have started in 1896. After over 100 years of on and off search for oil in the country, it was announced in 2007 that finally oil had been found in commercial quantities in Ghana by a consortium of companies including Kosmos and Tullow. Kosmos Energy announced in June 2007 the discovery of a “significant oil accumulation” at its Mahogany – 1 well. Two months later, Tullow Oil announced another significant discovery at its Hyedua – 1 well. Subsequent discoveries in four different offshore wells indicate that Ghana might possess up to 2 billion barrels of oil reserves. When final evaluations on the new Tullow find from the Tweneboa 2 well are added, the reserve potential may exceed 3 billion barrels of oil equivalent.

In the West Cape Three Points Block the original agreement signed on July 22, 2004 gave the operator, Kosmos 86.5% shares, EO Group 3.5% shares, and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) 10% shares. Kosmos later farmed part of its shares in the West Cape Three Points Block to Tullow (22.896%), Sabre & Gas (1.854%) and Anadarko (30.875%). Kosmos holds an 18% interest in the Deepwater Tano Block. An affiliate of Tullow Oil plc operates the block with a 49.95% interest. An affiliate of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation has an 18% interest; Sabre Oil & Gas has a 4.05% interest; and GNPC has a 10% carried interest.

The various oil wells dug in the two blocks were renamed the Jubilee field as the oil findf straddles the two blocks governed by two petroleum agreements. The oil companies involved and the GNPC have had to develop a “unitization agreement” to develop a joint contractual framework and geographically delimit the Jubilee field area. Following the agreement to modify holdings in Jubilee, Tullow, the operator, holds 34.7 percent; Kosmos controls 23.49 percent; Anadarko owns 23.49 percent; Sabre Oil & Gas holds 2.81 percent; EO Group has 1.75 percent; and Ghana National Petroleum Corp. has 13.75 percent.

Production from the Jubilee field is scheduled to begin in late 2010, with output expected to reach 120,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2011 -- and possibly 250,000 b/d by 2013 if a second floating production, storage and offloading vessel is deployed.

This article is the first in a series to get the Ghanaian public to engage in a pro-Ghana discourse about the oil find. This first article focuses on the issue of transparency. Who were the bidders and what was the nature of the bidding documents? Who are the actors behind Kosmos and Tullow? Who have been behind the EO Group that has at least 3.5% shares in the initial agreement signed by Kosmos and Ghana that gave 86.5% shares to Kosmos, 10% shares to GNPC and 3.5% shares to the EO Group?

Other questions include the nature of the agreement that allowed Kosmos to transfer part of its shares to Tullow? What were the first option clauses in the agreement that again made Kosmos sell off its remaining 23.5% shares to ExxonMobil that has created the impasse between Ghana and the big oil companies in one aspect, and the potential tension between Ghana on one side and the powerful US and the rising power China?

Another question is who has first rights to the oil and the natural gas that will be produced that will go to the oil companies (EO Group and Kosmos, Anadarko, Sabre and others)? Finally, how will Ghana get crude oil and natural gas for the refinery and other petro-chemical industries that are envisaged for the country?

Transparency Since the oil find was made in Ghana there have been calls for transparency as well as putting in place legal and institutional arrangements to ensure that the product becomes more of a blessing than a curse for Ghanaians.

The World Bank, IFC, Oxfam, and several other organizations have stressed the need for transparency. For example, in its report, Economy-Wide Impact of Oil Discovery in Ghana, issued in November 2009, the World Bank recommends that “Transparency could be improved as Ghana adopts and implements a Freedom of Information Act; and stipulates/enforces accountability mechanisms regarding: (i) the publication of reports on revenue and their use, and (ii) the disclosure of bidders‘ identity and bidding documents.” Similarly, Ian Gary, writing for Oxfam/ISODEC in a 2009 report titled Ghana’s Big Test, states that “…needed institutions, regulations, and transparency measures should be in place early on to avoid the corrosive and corrupting effects of oil booms seen elsewhere in Africa.”

It was announced in the news media on July 22, 2004 that Ghana had signed an oil exploration agreement with three companies for the West Cape Three Points block in the country’s territorial waters. They were Kosmos Energy of USA, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and E.O. Group of Companies. Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom, then Minister of Energy, signed for the Government; Mr. Douglass G. Manner signed for Kosmos Energy and Mr. S. Sekyere Abankwa, then Chairman of GNPC board of directors, signed for GNPC and Mr. Derick Oppong-Agyare of E.O. Group of Companies, signed for the Group of Companies.

According to the news account of the signing ceremony, the agreement, which was reached within a record time of three months, was based on previous seismic data provided by the GNPC and valued at an initial $30 million in the West Cape Three Points Block. This was the first acreage contract Kosmos had signed since its formation in 2003. The exploratory agreement was expected to run for seven years with operations in five basins.

Sekyere Abankwa, the GNPC Chairman, reportedly, said at the signing ceremony that GNPC had trust in Kosmos Energy’s ability to deliver and expressed the hope that oil would be found with Kosmos Energy’s involvement.

Mr. Manner, on behalf of Kosmos Energy expressed his company's commitment to the exploration project and promised to work assiduously to make the investment worthwhile. He noted that the GNPC seismic data had rich information and everything would be done to ensure that drilling would begin by the middle of next year. "We are very excited about the size and nature of the seismic data available," Mr. Manner said (GNA, July 22, 2004).

Was it possible that some of the initial founders of Kosmos Energy had knowledge of the GNPC seismic data prior to the company applying for a contract to explore the block? If so, who passed on the seismic and other GNPC data to the newly formed Kosmos Energy that had no previous oil exploration track record to speak of?

It is recalled here that oil had been found in the block by previous explorers such as Hunt and Philips Petroleum in the 1980s and 1990s. The wells were abandoned because deep seawater drilling was considered too risky and expensive at the time. Oil prices were too low then, and the technology for deep seawater drilling and data analysis was still in its infancy at that time.

A brief history indicates that Phillips Petroleum Company commenced exploration in the Tano-Cape Three Points basin in February 1974. They acquired several 2D seismic vintages totalling over 3,700 km, part of which covered the present Kosmos block. Phillips drilled one deepwater well and six shallow water wells that resulted in the discovery of the North and South Tano fields west of the current Kosmos block. Phillips relinquished the entire Tano Cape Three Points blocks in 1981.

After promotion of the area by GNPC in the early 1990s Hunt Oil acquired two licenses in the West Cape Three Points block that includes the current Kosmos block in 1996. The company acquired 2D seismic data totalling 2,225 km, and later acquired about 264 square kilometres of 3D seismic data to the east of the current Kosmos block. They drilled two deepwater and one shallow-water well. One of the deepwater wells resulted in a non-commercial discovery. These wells lie immediately east to the Kosmos block. Hunt relinquished the block in 2001.

After the year 2000, deep seawater drilling technology and computer technology for seismic data analysis had become highly advanced, and following the 9/11/2001 crisis, world prices for oil sky-rocketed. These factors, together with increased need to secure oil away from the troubled Persian Gulf area, led to rising interest in the West African area – now designated the New Gulf. Those dynamics attracted oil prospectors back to Ghana at a time when, coincidentally, the Kufuor administration was making Ghana oil laws “more investor friendly.”

Since coming to power in January 2009, the NDC government of Ghana headed by President John Atta-Mills has been perceived to be carrying out some vendetta against the New Patriotic Party (NPP). There were series of car seizures from NPP former state office holders in the Kufuor administration. A committee was set up to investigate the Ghana@50 planning committee and its appointees. The latest inquiry has been perceived by some people to be directed against the EO Group in relation to the oil find.

In the case of the oil find, it is important that any investigations should be done in a more open manner because, as enshrined in 1992 Constitution of Ghana, oil as a natural resource belongs to all Ghanaians not any one political party or any one group of people.

As suggested by the World Bank in its publication quoted above, the general public needs to know about the identities of the bidders and the bidding documents as well as the nature of the agreement reached between the oil companies and the state. Available information suggests that the agreement signed between Ghana and the oil companies is of the PSA (Production Sharing Agreement) type as outlined in the Model Petroleum Agreement that is available on GNPC's website.

There have been calls for revenue sharing arrangements from the oil find, but what revenue is to be shared is all tied to the contracts signed between the state and the private oil companies. A vague reference to parts of them already being in the public domain is not sufficient and does not constitute regular disclosure.

The World Bank for example doesn’t refer to leaked documents in connection with its own disclosure requirements. Neither does the IFC that has loaned money to some of the oil companies developing the Jubilee Field. If there is transparency, the government stands to gain the support of the general public, especially as the government attempts to take on the oil companies on one hand, and on the other hand the world powers that be – Britain, China, and the US.

Who are the players in the Ghana oil discovery? The immediate key actors in the unfolding drama surrounding the oil discovery are GNPC, the oil companies and political leaders of Ghana. Behind these front stage actors are some powerful backstage actors, directors, promoters and producers who see Ghana’s oil as being relevant to security interests of some countries other than Ghana. Let us first discuss the front stage actors: GNPC, the oil companies and political leaders of Ghana.

The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation was formed in 1985 as a state-owned entity and given legal backing under two main statues: PNDC Law 64 and PNDC Law 84. Initially GNPC focused on capacity building by acquiring and analysis of seismic and other geologically data, staff development and training, and acquisition of latest computer technology for data analysis.

When the EO Group was formed is not very clear. There is the assertion by some people that the involvement of EO Group in Ghana’s oil was done above board. Was it really? The EO Group lists Kwame Bawuah-Edusei and Derick Oppong-Agyare among its directors.

In other instances, Kwame Bawuah-Edusei is listed with George Owusu as the E and O in the name EO Group. We have already mentioned that Derick Oppong-Agyare, who was believed to be with the Quality Assurance unit of PricewaterhouseCoopers Ghana at the time, signed on behalf of the EO Group. We found very little else information about Derick Oppong-Agyare and we hope a FOIA is passed to make it possible to gain more information about him and other members of the board of directors of the EO Group.

As for Kwame Bawuah-Edusei, he was a medical doctor in family practice in the US until he was appointed Ghana’s ambassador to Austria and Switzerland and the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN offices and international organizations in Geneva and Vienna in August 2004 soon after the EO Group, Kosmos, GNPC and Ghana signed the oil exploratory agreement.

Dr. Kwame Bawuah-Edusei had no track record as having been a career diplomat. This has led to some people speculating that he must have been awarded with the ambassadorial appointment for his role in the oil discovery. Others claim he was one of the prominent NPP financial backers several of whom were also given ambassadorial and other patronage appointments in the Kufuor administration.

Dr. Bawuah-Edusei is believed to be a friend of former President Kufuor. He is believed to have lobbied the US Congress, the State Department and the World Bank for support for the development of a vibrant and sustainable democracy in Ghana.

Another Ghanaian in the Washington DC area well known in lobbying circles is Prof. George Ayittey of the American University. Prof. Ayittey was member of the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG).

AOPIG formed the US-Africa Energy Association, members of which included a number of serving and former Bush administration and several oil companies such as BP, Chevron, Texaco, Marathon, Shell and Anadarko. AOPIG and the US-Africa Energy Association lobbied the Bush Administration for the creation of AFRICOM. Was it coincidence that Anadarko also became a player in the Ghana oil find?

George Owusu, on the other hand, is said to be a trained environmental scientist who worked in the energy industry for about twenty years. He rose to the rank of commodity manager for Shell oil Company in Houston, U. S. He is believed to be a friend of Mr. Kan-Dapaah, Minister of Energy in the early part of the first Kufuor administration.

In 2001, with the help of the Greater Houston Partnership, a major business group in Houston (Texas) dedicated to the promotion of business between Houston companies and the rest of the world, Mr. George Owusu was said to have organized a conference in Houston addressed by energy experts from GNPC and the Energy Ministry of Ghana about the offshore hydrocarbon potentials in the country. Many companies in Texas and the rest of the world were believed to have attended the conference. Who were the officials from GNPC and the Energy Ministry who participated in the Houston conference? Was it George Owusu who invited these energy officials from Ghana? Who paid for their expenses to participate in that conference?

Soon after the Houston conference, the E.O Group is believed to have facilitated a visit to Ghana by Vanco Energy, according to news media. The Houston-based Vanco Energy signed an exploration agreement with the Ghanaian government in August 2002. Vanco Energy said at the time that it planned to invest $30 million to explore for oil on the West Cape Three Points Deepwater Block. However Vanco backed out of the deal. Reports indicated that Vanco backed out of the deal because it was too risky.

A Ghana News Agency (GNA) news report of June 19, 2002 indicated thus: “Meanwhile, in a breach of normal administrative law practice, two provisional acreage awards have gone for parliamentary approval without first winning formal Cabinet sanction. Vanco Energy's deep-water deal has gone forward as has Alderney Resources' Central Basin award, backed by local mining mogul Nic Amarteifio.”

At a later date, EO Group partnered with Ennex Energy of Ireland who were in Ghana but gave up on a deal that was reached. Sources indicated that Ennex walked out of the deal as they evaluated Ghana too risky to invest. However, in a Financial Times article of January 7, 2010, William Wallis and Martin Arnold, authors of the article quote John Craven of Ennex thus: “Geologically we wanted to do the deal. We could have raised the money to do it but we were uncomfortable with EO’s demands.” Could it be that Vanco backed out of the deal because they too were “uncomfortable with EO’s demands?”

In December 2003, reports indicate that George Owusu came into contact with some people who later emerged as part of the technical staff when Kosmos Energy was formed. Key founding members of Kosmos had been involved in Triton Energy that operated in Indonesia and also discovered oil in Equatorial Guinea. In both Indonesia and Equatorial Guinea Triton Energy became involved in allegations of corruption. These corruption allegations were the subject of extensive investigation by the US Congress and the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC).

E.O Group and Kosmos Energy are believed to have struck a deal to seek a contract in Ghana. Their application for a contract to explore the same block that Ennex backed out of - West Cape Three Points Block - was reported to have been approved in a record three months.

The Cape Three Points contract was the first oil exploration work for the newly formed company called Kosmos Energy. The agreement to explore the West Cape Three Points Block was announced on July 22, 2004. George Owusu was appointed Kosmos Energy’s representative in Ghana. Dr. Bawuah-Edusei was appointed Ghana’s Ambassador to Austria and Switzerland in 2004.

The questions that need to be answered are: What is it that EO Group offered besides their links to corridors of power for which they demanded to have a share in the block and have their fees paid? Why was Kosmos Energy given 86.5% share and EO Group 3.5% share for the block? Why was Bawuah-Edusei given Ambassadorial appointment to Austria and Switzerland soon after EO Group/Kosmos Energy application was approved? Was the EO Group a front for some other people? Why did Derick Oppong-Agyare sign on behalf of the EO Group? Besides EO Group’s possible links to people in power in Ghana, what else did the goup offer Kosmos for Kosmos to pay for EO Group’s shares and fees? These questions are asked because it is unusual in the oil industry that one partner will pay for the shares and fees of another.

Besides George Owusu, Derick Oppong-Agyare, Dr. Bawuah-Edusei and George Ayittey, we need to know more about Mr. Stephen Sekyere Abankwa and Mr. Thomas Manuh, Director of Operations and other former GNPC officials such as Tsatsu Tsikata as well as Daniel Opoku-Mensah, and Joe Klemesu of the Ministry of Energy.

Mr. Abankwa is a banker with Prudential Bank – the same bank believed to have given a $1 million unsecured loan to Kufuor’s son to buy an uncompleted hotel building for $3.5. J. S. Addo Consultants. He is also listed as chairman of the Board of Directors of Lushann Eternit. Lushann Eternit was based in Houston and headed by Quincy Kwesi Sintim Aboagye. A GNA report of June 19, 2002 indicated that “Steven Sekyere-Abankwa, a professional banker, was appointed [chairman of the board of GNPC] in secret several weeks ago.”

Lushann Eternit had a contract to drill oil from the Saltpond field. GNPC had 40% shares and Lushann Eternit had 60% shares in that contract Later the agreement was re-arranged to give Lushann Eternit 55% shares and GNPC 45%. Lushann Eternit was not required to pay royalties nor rental fees. In the Lushann operations on two separate occasions oil tanker carrying oil from Saltpond to TOR disappeared on highseas ending at Nigeria eventually. Reportedly, one of the tankers carried 73,000 barrels of oil valued over $2 million. The tanker was later found in Nigeria. Lushann Eternit also secured an energy contract with VRA when Dr. Wereko-Brobbey was head of the Authority. The energy contract became embroiled in a legal tussle. Lushann Eternit was represented in this case by the Akuffo Addo legal chambers. By the way, legal counsel for S. Sekyere Abankwa and Dr. Wereko-Brobbey during the Ghana@50 probe came from the same Nana Akuffo Addo chambers. It is also alleged that Nana Akuffo Addo’s legal chambers were paid a whopping sum of money to draft the divesture agreement for the sale of Ghana Telecom. Coincidence?

After almost 20 years of assembling data, analyzing and promoting the petroleum potential of Ghana at various international fora, GNPC walked away with an infinitesimal 10% share in the Jubilee oil find while EO Group walked away with 3.5% share. Was national interest sacrificed at the altar of personal interests?

The Atta-Mills administration could do Ghanaians a favor by disclosing the bidders’ identities and the oil development plan reached with the oil companies. In this instance, transparency does not refer only to revenue accruing to government but also to all stakeholders. Transparency in terms of the full disclosure of the content of all agreements our governments have signed with the oil companies will clear doubts about the country’s interest that has been sacrificed for pittance, and with the unsubstantiated promise that many people will be employed at the development phase of the oil production. How will the production affect communities in the Sharma, Ahanta, Elembelle, Egwira and Jomoro districts, and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan area? What environmental and social impact assessments have been done in these communities? Next in the series will be articles that will discuss how the oil money should be used to transform the Ghanaian economy and how the oil money should be shared.

After the transparency issue, we hope to discuss the kinds of industries to be established in relation to the oil so as to transform the present economy of the country. The focus on oil-related industries to facilitate the transformation of the Ghanaian economy will be done in the context of the global energy and its geo-politics. We hope the industries that will be set up will have more backward and forward linkages to other sectors of the Ghanaian economy. After discussing industries we will tackle revenue sharing in a subsequent article on the isue of revenue sharing of the oil proceeds that will accrue to Ghana, we will be taking a critical look at the existing revenue sharing arrangements for the mining of bauxite, gold, diamonds, and manganese. We will also take a look at the EITI model for the mining industries in the country. We will take a look at revenue sharing models from Botswana (for diamonds), Alaska and Norway (for oil). We need to have this comprehensive approach in discussing the oil find in Ghana so that we do not polarize the country along NDC/NPP political acrimony; neither do we need to polarize the country along ethnic/tribal lines. Ghana is a pluralistic society where all ethnic groups live and work among each other and we have strong inter-ethnic marriages, school class mates and work partners. For example, in the cocoa growing areas of Western Region, one finds migrant farmers from all parts of the country establishing and operating cocoa farms.

This is a project of the CPP Global Forum

Nana Apau: adinkraba2@yahoo.com

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